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Abstract 
 
Since 1985, the U.S. market has been facing an increase in merger and 
acquisition activity. In addition to detect potential determinants of M&A 
success, this thesis does not only examine the short-term performance of 
acquirers and targets, but it also determines the long-term M&A perfor-
mance of U.S. acquirers across all industries. With a sample of 1,288 
M&As between 2002 and 2015, we found negative short-term abnormal re-
turns to acquirers using the cumulative abnormal return method. However, 
since target shareholders gain significantly higher abnormal returns, M&As 
create value overall from a short-term perspective. Acquirers’ negative 
short-term abnormal returns persist in being negative over the long-term 
analysis. The buy-and-hold abnormal return method in event-time reveals 
significant value destruction of 25.8% over a three-year investigation pe-
riod. Also, the study detects a significant impact of the acquirer´s and tar-
get´s price-to-book ratio, method of payment, relative profitability, and 
deal rationale on the long-term post-acquisition performance. However, the 
influence of relative size is inconclusive and could not ultimately be deter-
mined in this study. Lastly, the acquisition attitude (friendly vs. hostile) 
and cross-border transactions provided no evidence of affecting deal suc-
cess.  
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1 Introduction  
Empirical research on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been popu-
lar during the past decades, and some of the questions raised are: does 
M&As create wealth for the acquiring company, and if it does, what deter-
mines the success. The literature defines successful M&As as transactions 
that provide acquiring shareholders with abnormal returns relative to in-
vestments in firms with similar risk profile. Research with a focus on the 
short-term announcement effects concludes that U.S. M&As, in average, 
earn negative abnormal returns (Walker, 2000). Moreover, research con-
ducted by Moeller et al. (2003) indicates significant negative long-term 
post-merger abnormal returns for the acquiring companies. This poses a 
challenge to the management of acquirers, and it therefore needs to iden-
tify determinants of successful M&As.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of M&As in the U.S. (imaa, 2019). 
 
 
Since the 19s, companies have undergone a profound change driven by 
technology and digitalization. Companies have reacted to those shifts in 
demand by doing M&As. Figure 1 shows the development in M&A activ-
ity from 1985 to 2019 in the United States. There have been more than 
325,000 M&As since 1985, with an accumulated value of $34,900 billion. 
2017 was a record year in terms of number of deals, which ended at a total 
of 15,100 transactions, a 12.2% increase over 2016. From 1985 to 2018, the 
compound annual growth rate for the number of deals was 5.86%.  
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There are some methodological difficulties in assessing abnormal returns, 
and thus previous studies focus, usually, only on either short- or long-term 
abnormal returns. Contrary to most prior studies, we are going to analyze 
both. For the short-term study, we examine acquirers and targets an-
nouncement abnormal returns, while for the long-term analysis, we only 
determine the long-term performance of U.S. acquirers. However, we are 
not going to look at specific industries, as we want to detect potential ge-
neric determinants of M&A success. To evaluate short-term success, we are 
going to use the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) method, while we fo-
cus on the Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal-Return (BHAR) method for the long-
term analysis. In addition, we are going to see if CAR produces similar 
long-term results as BHAR. By using the BHAR method, we should be 
able to detect statistically reliable indications of success and to identify po-
tential determinants of long-term M&A success with their respective im-
pact.  
 
The market efficiency hypothesis states that stock prices reflect infor-
mation to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information 
(the profits to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs (Jensen, 1978). 
Put differently; there are no abnormal returns to gain. Therefore, the re-
search questions of this thesis can be stated as follow:  
 
Is the market efficient? If it´s not, which deal, acquirer and target char-
acteristics contribute towards long-term M&A success (measured by ac-
quirers BHAR)?  
 
There are two goals of this thesis. Firstly, we want to extend previous 
research on short-term performance of acquirers and targets by expanding 
the analysis to include acquirer’s long-term performance. Secondly, we will 
use the observed long-term abnormal returns to examine and, hopefully, 
identify which aspects of a M&A deal contributes to success.  
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In section 2, we dis-
cuss what M&A is, the motives behind M&As, how to measure success, ef-
fects of doing M&As and what determines abnormal returns. In section 3, 
we provide our hypotheses regarding the overall short- and long-term effect 
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of M&As and the impact of potential determinants on long-term perfor-
mance. Thereafter, in section 4, we discuss different models and which we 
are going to use. In section 5, we present our data, how we collected it and 
the choice of independent variables. Lastly, we discuss our results and then 
provide conclusions.  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 General Theory of M&As 
We can split M&As into two groups: mergers and consolidations. When 
we are talking about mergers, two companies become one entity (Gaughan, 
2007). The target company does no longer exist as the acquiring company 
take over its liabilities and assets. However, in a consolidation, two compa-
nies become one unit, where both initial companies cease to exist. The two 
companies form a new entity, where the old shareholders of both compa-
nies become shareholders in the new entity (Gaughan, 2007; Kim et al., 
2011).  
2.2 Why Doing M&As 
Acquisitions can be thought of as strategic decisions. However, the mo-
tives behind acquisitions differ across transactions (Trautwein, 1990). It is 
argued by several researchers that the main motive behind an acquisition 
is to gain synergies (Kim et al., 2011; Damodaran, 2005). Synergy is ob-
tained if the value of the combined company exceeds the sum of the two 
independent companies. We can divide synergies into operating and finan-
cial synergies. Operational synergies are defined as achieving economies of 
scale, higher growth potential and increased pricing power. This should 
yield higher cash flows, and hence, increase shareholder value. On the 
other hand, financial synergy results in higher firm value because of tax 
benefits, diversification and debt capacity. This will be reflected in a lower 
cost of capital and/or increased cash flows.  
 
Motives Behind M&As Explanation 
Economies of Scale Increased production with lower marginal costs 
Vertical Integration Reduced risk by controlling the supply chain 
Expertise Gain new expertise that the company does not 
have nor could learn 
Efficiency Gains  Reduced costs because of elimination of overlap-
ping tasks 
Operating Losses Reduce taxes by acquiring unprofitable businesses 
Diversification Diversification should reduce operational risk 
Earnings Growth Earnings growth by acquiring high-growth firms 
Monopoly Gains Increased market power weakens the competitors 
Figure 2: List of motives for doing M&As (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). 
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2.3 Successful & Unsuccessful M&As 
From the perspective of the acquiring company´s shareholders, M&As 
are value-destroying on average (Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). However, there 
are different definitions of unsuccessful M&As. One definition is presented 
by Sevenius (2011). He argues that M&As are unsuccessful if the transac-
tion does not live up to the expectations. Bruner (2009), however, argues 
that the benchmark for whether a M&A is unsuccessful or not is the inves-
tors required rate of return. Hence, if the acquisition delivers a return 
higher than required by investors, the transaction is successful. In contrast, 
a return lower than investors required rate of return yields an unsuccessful 
transaction.  
 
Regardless, there are several important factors impacting the outcome of 
a M&A. In figure 3, we have listed potential qualitative factors that need 
to be fulfilled for a M&A to be successful per several researchers.  
 
Pre-M&A phase During M&A Post-M&A phase 
1. Assessment of strategic issues 
and fit 
1. Avoiding overpayment 1. Implementing integration plans 
at appropriate speed 
2. Conducting due diligence and 
assessment of synergies across 
hard areas (e.g. financials) as well 
as soft areas (e.g. culture) 
2. Continued commitment of 
leadership 
2. Taking tangible steps towards 
integration 
3. Careful planning for integration 
issues (e.g. financial integration 
vs. operational integration) 
3. Appropriate communication 3. Involvement of due diligence 
team in integration 
4. Leveraging prior experience of 
M&A 
 
 4. Setting intermediate goals to re-
alize the final benefits of M&A 
5. Comprehensive assessment of 
risk 
 5. Managing HR issues 
 
6. Careful assessment of the capa-
bilities of both companies 
 6. Taking steps to integrate the 
culture of the two companies 
Figure 3: Qualitative factors affecting M&A success (References are removed 
for making it easier to read). 
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2.4 Effects of Doing M&As   
We have introduced different motives behind M&As, and the effects of 
those motives must be addressed. One should think that M&As are thor-
oughly thought out investments, and hence be profitable for acquirers. Re-
cent studies on U.S. M&As do not share this view. 
 
Study Data Methodology Period Results 
Loughran & Vijh (1997) 
 
 
 
Mitchell & Stafford (2000) 
 
 
 
Moeller et al. (2003) 
 
 
Dube & Glascock (2006) 
947 U.S. M&As between 
1970-1989 
 
 
2,193 U.S. M&As between 
1958-1993 
 
 
12,023 U.S. M&As be-
tween 1980-2001 
 
255 U.S. M&As between 
1975-1996 
BHAR after size and 
book-to-market ad-
justments 
 
BHAR and calendar 
time portfolio with 
FF3F 
 
BHAR and calendar 
time portfolio 
 
Calendar time port-
folio with FF3F and 
FF4F 
5 years 
 
 
 
3 years 
 
 
 
3 years 
 
 
3 years 
 
 
-15.9% significant 
abnormal returns 
 
 
No significant abnor-
mal returns 
 
 
-16.02% significant 
abnormal returns 
 
No significant abnor-
mal returns 
 
Figure 4: Key papers on U.S. acquirer’s long-term post-merger performance. 
 
In the paper of Loughran & Vijh (1997), 947 U.S. acquisitions between 
1970-1989 were assessed. Abnormal returns were estimated using the 
BHAR method with an event-window of five years. They adjusted their 
benchmark for size and book-to-market effects because the acquisition 
sample was not distributed equally across the size and book-to-market 
spectrum. To finish the benchmark, their matching procedure paired ac-
quirers with control firms by their required rate of return. The sample 
firms earned an average five-year buy-and-hold return of 81.2% compared 
to 97.1% for their matching firms. This corresponds to an average abnor-
mal return of -15.9% for acquirers, which was statistically significant. 
Thus, concluding that M&As are value-destroying.  
 
Mitchell & Stafford (2000) analyzed 2,193 U.S. acquisitions from 1958 to 
1993 using the BHAR and calendar-time portfolio methods, where abnor-
mal returns were estimated over a three-year time horizon. To determine 
abnormal returns, they used a benchmark that was created using market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratios of non-event firms. They show 
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that event-firm abnormal returns are positively cross-correlated when over-
lapping in calendar time. For inference purposes, they adjusted the t-sta-
tistics hoping it would give more trustworthy results. They report evidence 
of negligible long-term abnormal returns when controlling for the positive 
cross-correlation. Hence, they support the null hypothesis of zero mean ab-
normal returns.  
 
In another study, Moeller et al. (2003) examined a sample of 12,023 U.S. 
M&As from 1980 to 2001. Rather than choosing one approach, they used 
both calendar- and event-time methods. They followed the method pro-
posed by Fama (1998) for the calendar-time approach. For each calendar 
month, they created an equally weighted portfolio of the firms that made 
an acquisition in the past three years, measured relative to the completion 
date of the deal. The result showed an insignificant monthly abnormal re-
turn of -0.041% and concluded that there is no evidence of poor long-term 
performance of U.S. acquirers. However, for the event-time analysis, they 
followed the approach of Barber & Lyon (1997). The investigation period 
was set to three years and matched event-firms with control firms using 
the market value of assets and book-to-market ratios. In contrast to the 
calendar-time approach, they found a significant abnormal return of         
-16.02%.  
 
255 U.S. acquisitions were analyzed by Dube & Glascock (2006) from 
1975 to 1996, using the calendar-time method over a three-year horizon. 
To avoid new-listing bias and problems of severe cross-sectional depend-
ence due to overlapping returns, they filtered the sample only to keep 
firms that participated in one M&A within the next five years. For the cal-
endar-time method, the Fama and French three-factor (FF3F) and the 
four-factor model was applied. Abnormal return was determined using 
both value-weighted and equally-weighted approaches. In conformity with 
Mitchell & Stafford (2000), they did not find significant abnormal returns.  
 
With the four studies above as a basis, M&As provide either negative or 
zero abnormal returns for acquiring shareholders. In the cases of negative 
abnormal returns, there are three suggested explanations for this underper-
formance. First, from a behavioral point of view, the market slowly cor-
rects its overvaluation of the merged firms´ shares (Ruback & Wurgler, 
 13 
2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). Second, M&As are a reaction to negative 
industry shocks. However, the merged firm might perform better than it 
would have without the M&A, which may still be worse than the pre-
M&A performance (Hartford, 2005). Lastly, the underperformance is a 
consequence of the econometric methodology itself (Betton, Eckbo & Thor-
burn, 2008), where the returns might not be properly adjusted for risk.  
2.5 Determinants of Abnormal Returns 
The majority of prior research estimates abnormal returns in an event 
study to assess whether a M&A is successful or not. There are several fac-
tors that likely may affect abnormal returns, and those can be divided into 
firm and deal characteristics. 
 
Factor Effect Key papers 
Method of pay-
ment: • Cash payment yields higher abnormal returns than stock 
payment 
Gregory (1997), Loughran & Vijh (1997), 
Franks et al. (1991), Myers & Majluf 
(1984), Kaplan & KPMG (2007), An-
drade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001) 
Size: 
• Larger acquirers gain higher announcement abnormal re-
turns. In contrast, other studies say that smaller acquirers 
are on average more successful than bigger acquirers 
• Negative relationship between deal size and acquirer´s ab-
normal return 
 
 
Laabs & Schiereck (2008), Schlinge-
mann & Moeller (2004), Loderer & 
Martin (1990), Khansa (2015), Fuller et 
al. (2002), Agrawal et al. (1992), Eckbo 
et al. (1990), Kaplan & KPMG (2007) 
Profitability 
 • Acquirers and targets with lower P/E ratios yield higher ab-
normal returns than acquirers and targets with high P/E ra-
tios 
• Inverse relation between targets ROE and acquirer’s abnor-
mal returns 
• Some studies say that relative profitability, measured by 
ROE, has a significant effect, while other says it has not 
Kaplan & KPMG (2007), Moore et al. 
(2012), Houston & Ryngaert (1994), 
Hawawini & Swary (1990) 
Cross-border 
M&As: 
 
 
 
M&A attitude: 
• Divided view in the literature. Some finds positive abnormal 
returns, while other finds negative or insignificant abnormal 
returns 
 
• Friendly takeovers yield 4% higher abnormal returns 
• Hostile takeovers tend to yield negative abnormal returns 
Schlingemann & Moeller (2004), Dar-
kow et al. (2008), Bris et al. (2008), Lo-
winski et al. (2004) nor Higgins & Ro-
driguez (2006) 
 
 
Schleifer & Vishny (2003), Travlos 
(1987), Wanseley et al. (1983) 
Figure 5: Key factors affecting abnormal returns. 
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2.5.1   Method of Payment 
M&As financed with stocks may send a negative signal to the market 
that the acquirers´ stocks is overvalued (Myers & Majluf, 1984). All else 
equal, stock payments should yield lower abnormal returns than cash pay-
ments (Hansen, 1987), which may be a result of asymmetric information. 
This is supported by the findings of Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001), 
as they found lower abnormal returns for M&As financed with stocks. In 
addition, targets prefer cash payments, as the target bear risk in holding 
the acquirer´s stock (Kirchhoff & Schiereck, 2011). Thus, the literature 
seems to agree that stock payments affects abnormal return. It is worth-
while to mention that target shareholders pay tax on capital gains immedi-
ately in cash-for-stock deals. Hence, cash deals may be costly because the 
implied capital gains tax penalty forces higher target premiums (Betton, 
Eckbo & Thorburn, 2008).  
2.5.2   Size 
Schlingemann & Moeller (2004) found that the size of the acquiring com-
pany had a significant effect on abnormal returns. Larger acquirers gained 
higher announcement abnormal returns compared to smaller acquirers. An-
other size measure used in previous research is deal value. Loderer & Mar-
tin (1990) claim that larger deals tend to be value-destroying because ac-
quirers overpay. The overpayments may be due to overconfident managers 
(Roll, 1986). In conformity, a negative correlation between the acquirer’s 
abnormal return and the deal value was found by Khansa (2015), suggest-
ing that acquiring shareholders regarded larger deals as more risky invest-
ments.  
2.5.3   Profitability 
A study conducted by Moore, Braggion & Dwarkasing (2012), examined 
how the profitability of the target company affects the outcome of a M&A. 
The result indicates that target’s return on equity (ROE) and the ac-
quirer’s post-merger return have an inverse relation. Hence, the lower the 
target ROE, the higher the abnormal return for the acquiring company. 
That is because the management of the acquiring company may improve 
the profitability of the target company, thus create substantial additional 
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value. Furthermore, Houston & Ryngaert (1994) studied the effect of rela-
tive profitability on abnormal returns. They measured relative profitability 
as the difference between the two-year ROE of acquirer and target preced-
ing the announcement. The result showed that the combined entity return 
was not affected by relative profitability. Even though this study is old, it 
provides further insight into this potential determinant’s impact on deal 
success. Another alternative to measure profitability is to examine acquir-
ers and targets price-to-earnings ratio (P/E). Kaplan & KPMG (2007) 
found that acquisitions made by acquirers who had low P/E yielded signif-
icantly higher returns than acquirers with high P/E. Similarly, acquisitions 
of targets with low P/E yielded significantly higher returns than acquisi-
tions of targets with high P/E.  
2.5.4   Cross-border M&As 
One may earn abnormal returns from cross-border transactions when ac-
quiring a target in countries with worse accounting standards and share-
holder protection (Bris et al., 2008). It is argued that the cultural differ-
ences in cross-border acquisitions might affect M&A volume and abnormal 
returns (Ahern et al., 2012). Schlingemann & Moeller (2004) found that 
cross-border M&As provided negative diversification effect. Thus, cross-
border deals tend to destroy value. However, neither Lowinski et al. (2004) 
nor Higgins & Rodriguez (2006) could find cross-border acquisitions to in-
fluence M&A success.  
2.5.5   M&A Attitude 
Schleifer & Vishny (2003) studied the effect of friendly vs. hostile takeo-
vers on abnormal returns. For the acquiring company, friendly takeovers 
provided 4% higher returns than hostile ones. However, for the target com-
pany, hostile takeovers yielded a 10% higher return than friendly ones. 
This probably reflects the higher premiums paid in hostile takeovers or the 
decrease in enterprise value of the acquiring company due to the takeover 
defense. A hostile takeover may, however, be viewed as a desperate at-
tempt to improve the business model of the target. Thus, it could send a 
negative signal to the market, which might cause shareholders to speculate 
on overvaluation of the acquirer’s stock price (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2000). 
Therefore, hostile takeovers tend to yield lower abnormal returns.  
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As a conclusion, there are several firm- and deal-characteristics that pro-
vide different impacts on abnormal returns. The literature is, however, 
quite mixed on some of the potential determinants.  
3 Hypotheses  
3.1 The Overall Effect on Abnormal Returns  
Previous research shows that short-term announcement abnormal re-
turns for U.S. acquiring companies are either insignificant or significantly 
negative (Walker, 2000). In contrast, targets shareholders tend to earn 
positive announcement returns. Because prior research is quite consistent 
on this finding, we expect to find the same. Studies on long-term post-mer-
ger performance for acquiring companies indicate negative abnormal re-
turns. This is attributed to several reasons, among them, lack of risk man-
agement, wrong motive behind the deal and type of acquisition. Therefore, 
we expect to find similar results.  
 
H1 Overall, U.S. acquirers experience negative short-term announce-
ment abnormal returns, while targets earn positive short-term abnormal 
returns. Acquirers negative short-term abnormal returns persists in being 
negative in the long-run.  
3.2 The Impact of Acquirer, Target and Deal Charac-
teristics  
In this section, we are going to present several hypotheses regarding the 
impact of the acquirer, target and deal characteristics on long-term abnor-
mal returns for U.S. acquirers.  
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Variables Hypothesis Short-term Long-term 
Overall effect 
    Acquirer 
    Target 
1  
Negative 
Positive 
 
Negative 
    
Cross-border deal 2  Negative 
 
Relative profitability 
 
3 
  
Positive 
 
P/B acquirer and target 
 
4 
  
Negative 
 
Method of payment: 
   Cash 
   Stocks 
 
5 
  
 
Positive 
Negative 
 
M&A attitude:  
    Friendly 
    Hostile 
 
Relative size 
 
6 
 
 
7 
  
 
Positive 
Negative 
 
Negative 
Figure 6: Overview of hypotheses and predicted value impact (Deal 
rationale is excluded as it contains 10 different rationales). 
 
Many researchers focus on the effect of internationalization on long-run 
wealth creation for acquirers, and the results are quite consistent. The lit-
erature uniformly points to long-term negative abnormal returns for ac-
quirers engaging in cross-border M&As (Black et al., 2001; Chatterjee, 
2004). It is argued that cross-border transactions yield more challenging 
post-merger integration and that acquirers have imperfect information, re-
sulting in negative abnormal returns (Conn et al. 2005).  
 
H2 Cross-border M&As will perform worse than domestic transactions. 
 
There have been several studies in the literature reporting the signifi-
cance of relative profitability. Relatively more profitable acquirers can im-
prove the targets’ business models and thereby create substantial addi-
tional value (Hawawini & Swary, 1990). This is supported by Moore, Brag-
gion & Dwarkasing (2012), where they found an inverse relation between 
targets ROE and acquirers abnormal returns.  
 
H3 The greater the difference in relative profitability between acquirer 
and target, the greater the positive impact on long-term abnormal returns.  
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It should be noted, however, most previous studies of M&A success re-
ported in the open literature has some knowledge gaps. To the best of our 
knowledge, the case of acquirers and targets price-to-book (P/B) ratio has 
not been given considerable attention by researchers in the past, and this 
motivated the present study. Instead, the P/E multiple has been exam-
ined. Acquisitions made by acquirers with low P/E were more successful 
than acquirers with high P/E (Kaplan & KPMG, 2007). Furthermore, tar-
gets with low P/E yielded higher returns than targets with high P/E. We 
expect to find similar results for acquirers and targets P/B ratio on M&A 
success.  
 
H4  Acquirer´s and target´s P/B has a negative impact on abnormal re-
turns.  
 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the method of 
payment’s impact on M&A success. Travlos (1987) found that M&As fi-
nanced with cash yielded positive long-term abnormal returns, and in con-
trast, M&As financed with stocks yielded negative long-term abnormal re-
turns. The above finding is consistent with the study by Antoniou & Zhao 
(2004).  
 
H5 Cash payments yield higher long-term abnormal returns than stock 
payments.  
 
The relationship between M&A attitude and success has been widely in-
vestigated. Previous research findings have been consistent; friendly takeo-
vers yield higher returns than hostile ones (Servaes, 1991). This is due to 
that hostile takeovers require higher premiums, and might, therefore, re-
duce the success potential. Friendly takeovers, however, require lower pre-
miums and may give the acquirer better chances at capitalizing the syner-
gies. 
 
H6 Friendly takeovers perform better than hostile ones. 
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Following Darkow & Schiereck (2008), relative size can be measured as 
the deal value divided by the acquirer’s size. The relative size of a transac-
tion might reflect the total synergy potential and thus indicates the suc-
cess potential of a M&A. However, larger transactions are usually more 
complex; hence integration costs may be much higher (Hawawini & Swary, 
1990). It could also be harder to manage and more expensive to acquire 
larger targets, which may impact the M&A negatively (Agrawal et al., 
1992; Fuller et al., 2002).  
 
H7 Higher relative size has a negative impact on abnormal returns. 
4 Methodology  
4.1 Event Study Methodology  
To assess the impact of a corporate event on stock prices, Fama et al. 
(1969) developed a method called event study. Event studies give a better 
understanding of the impact on market returns of corporate decisions and 
behavior (Campbell et al., 1997; Barber & Lyon, 1997). Event study meth-
odology has become the most common technique to measure an event’s im-
pact on short- and long-run returns. The objective of such a study is to de-
termine if the sample firms yield abnormal returns that are statistically 
significant different from zero. Finding non-zero abnormal returns means 
that investors have either under-reacted or over-reacted to an event. That 
is, corporate surprises which are not reflected in the stock price, assuming 
no inside information trading (“run-up”). One can say that testing for non-
zero abnormal returns is the same as testing for market efficiency (Kothari 
& Warner, 2008).  
4.2 Models for Estimating and Testing Abnormal Re-
turns  
In recent finance literature, two methods are commonly used to test and 
measure abnormal returns. The CAR method is usually used to estimate 
and test short-term announcement effects, while the BHAR method is typ-
ically used to determine and test long-term abnormal returns. However, 
the model that forms the basis for estimating abnormal returns in general 
is the market model: 
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𝑅푖푡 = 𝛼푖 + 𝛽푖𝑅푚푡 + 𝑒푖푡 
 𝐸 𝑒푖푡 = 0      𝜎2 𝑒푖푡 = 𝜎푒푖2  (1) 
 
where the residual 𝑒푖푡, express abnormal return with expectation equal to 
zero and a constant variance. We can then derive abnormal return to be:  
 
 𝐴𝑅푖푡 = 𝑅푖푡 − (𝛼푖 + 𝛽푖𝑅푚푡). (2) 
 
Some researchers suggest using an adjusted market model instead (Bar-
ber & Lyon, 1997). When estimating abnormal returns using an adjusted 
market model, one simply takes the difference between the buy-and-hold 
return of a company and an appropriate benchmark: 
 
 𝐴𝑅푖푡 = 𝑅푖푡 − 𝑅푏푚 . (3) 
 
By taking the sum of the monthly abnormal returns, we arrive at the 
CAR model (Fama, 1998):  
 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅푖 𝜏1, 𝜏2 = 𝐴𝑅푖휏휏2휏=휏1  
 
(4) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅푖 𝜏1, 𝜏2  is the cumulative abnormal return for sample firm i for 
any time interval 𝜏1, 𝜏2 . CAR is estimated by taking the sum of the 
event firm´s realized return less it´s expected return during the event win-
dow.  
 
  Moving forward, the adjusted market model forms the basis for the 
BHAR method:  
 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅푖푡 = (1 +𝐴𝑅푖푡)푇푡=1 − 1 (5) 
 
where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅푖푡 represents the buy-and-hold abnormal return for sample 
firm i in period t. The intuition behind the BHAR model is that one buys 
the merged firm´s stock in the same month as merger completion, and 
then holding it three to five years, or until delisting, whichever comes first. 
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Then, one estimate BHAR by compounding the monthly difference be-
tween the expected return of the merged company and the realized return 
to a benchmark.  
4.3 Benchmarks for Long-Term Abnormal Returns 
Earlier event studies by Brown & Warner (1980, 1985), Dyckman, Phil-
brick & Stephan (1984), and Campbell & Wesley (1993) all used market 
indexes as a benchmark to the event firms. However, the empirical specifi-
cation of test statistics they apply were based on abnormal returns for 
shorter periods, for instance a day or a couple of months. Implementing 
them over to be employed on long-run abnormal returns will yield misspec-
ified test statistics (empirical rejection rates exceed theoretical rejection 
rates), as argued by Fama (1998). Barber & Lyon (1997) traces the mis-
specification to three sources of biases when calculating abnormal returns 
using an index as a benchmark. The three biases include: 
• New listing bias, which occurs in long-run event studies using an in-
dex as reference. Typically, post-event returns are conducted over 
three or five years, and indexes used as references might include 
firms that begin trading subsequent to the event start. 
• Rebalancing bias is misspecification due to indexes typically being 
calculated assuming periodic rebalancing, whereas event firms are 
compounded without rebalancing. 
• The skewness bias is a positive skew of multi-year returns. The 
skewness arises as a result of the lower bound being -100%, while 
returns are unbound on the upside. 
Nevertheless, long-term abnormal return event studies are also subject 
to cross-dependence bias embedded in the sample observations rather than 
the benchmark (Brav, 1997). Cross-sectional dependence in event studies is 
caused by overlapping event periods and calendar clustering. Overlapping 
periods of return calculations occur when the same event firm participates 
in multiple M&As in the same investigation time. This will yield an out-
come of non-independent abnormal returns. While calendar clustering is 
caused by sample firms sharing the same event date. 
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The follow-up paper by Barber, Lyon & Tsai (1999) addresses both mis-
specifications; biases due to utilizing an index portfolio as reference and 
the cross-dependence bias. They developed elaborate techniques with alter-
natives to market indexes as a proxy when calculating abnormal returns. 
The paper presents two different approaches to solve the biases:  
(i) Carefully constructed reference portfolios, such that the popu-
lation mean abnormal return is assured to be zero. Whereas 
cross-correlation misspecification is resolved by either using a 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics or the empirically 
generated distribution of mean long-run abnormal stock re-
turns from pseudo-portfolios.  
(ii) Non-event control firms as a benchmark selected on the basis 
of firm-specific characteristics such as industry, market capi-
talization, book-to-market etc.  
However, Mitchell & Stafford (2000) argues that the test statistics ob-
tained through Lyon et al. (1999) techniques require that abnormal returns 
are independent across firms. Mergers and other corporate actions are not 
random events, and thus event samples are unlikely to consist of independ-
ent observations. That is because mergers seem to be cyclical and happen 
in waves for industries and thus cluster through time and industry (Gort, 
1969). Fortunately, Jegadeesh & Karceski (2009) addresses the shortcom-
ings of Lyon et al. (1999) methodology by proposing test statistics that are 
well-specified in nonrandom samples. Thus, resolving the issues haunting 
long-run abnormal return event studies. The approach succeeds by produc-
ing a standard error reflecting the properties of the sample. 
4.4 Construction of Benchmark Portfolios 
We follow Barber, Lyon & Tsai (1999) when constructing the bench-
mark portfolios for the long-run analysis. The first step is to download all 
stock data for NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq that is available from CRSP be-
tween 2002 and 2015. Since we are interested in the return of common 
stocks, we exclude ADR’s, closed-end funds, foreign-domiciled firms, 
primes and scores and real estate investments trusts. We then calculate 
the firm size in June for each year using CRSP end-of-month prices and 
the total number of shares outstanding. All NYSE firms are then ranked 
 23 
on the basis of their market capitalization in June to create 10 size decile 
portfolios. Similar to Jegadeesh & Karceski (2009) and Mitchell & Stafford 
(2000), AMEX and Nasdaq firms are afterward placed in the appropriate 
NYSE size decile on the basis of their June firm size. Firms listed on 
Nasdaq has relatively low market capitalization, resulting in 42% of all 
Nasdaq firms are placed in the smallest decile of firm size (decile 1). 
Hence, we further divide it into quintiles without regard to stock exchange, 
resulting in a total of 14 size categories. Each category is further divided 
into five book-to-market quintiles. The book-to-market ratio is also com-
puted using June market capitalization, while we use the most recent 
book-value of equity as of December in each individual year. This process 
results in a total of 70 size/benchmark reference portfolios, where the firms 
are annually reclassified into various size and benchmark deciles at the end 
of June every year using constant breakpoints. To finish off the benchmark 
portfolio, all firms that had participated in M&As after 1995 were re-
moved, such that the benchmark contains only non-event firms.   
4.5 The Choice of Methodology 
4.5.1   Short-Term Methodology 
The short-term announcement abnormal returns are determined follow-
ing the methodology of Brown & Warner (1985), using the CAR method. 
This model is commonly used for short-term studies (see, e.g. Laabs & 
Schiereck, 2008). To determine abnormal returns, we use the standard 
market model from equation (1), where the S&P 500 serves as the market 
index for the U.S. acquirers and targets. For cross-border targets, their re-
spective domestic market indexes have been used. The market model is es-
timated using OLS regression over a 230-trading day period. The trading 
period starts at day 𝑡 = −250 relative to the announcement date of the 
M&A. Based on the estimated expected returns, abnormal returns for all 
acquirers and targets were determined. The longest event window exam-
ined is 41 days: 𝑇 = −20; +20  days, 𝑡 = 0 being the announcement day 
of the M&A.  
 
Three t-statistics are used to test for statistical significance (see appen-
dix for formulas). The first is a crude dependence adjusted t-test by Brown 
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& Warner (1980), where a single variance is estimated for the entire port-
folio. Second, the cross-sectional test, as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) 
considers potential event-induced increase in standard deviation by com-
bining variance information from the event and the estimation period. 
Lastly, some research provides evidence that non-parametric t-statistics 
can be more powerful than parametric t-statistics (Barber & Lyon, 1996). 
Therefore the non-parametric GST is also applied (Cowan et al., 1990). 
4.5.2   Long-Term Methodology 
Earlier discussion denotes BHAR and calendar-time portfolios as the two 
most popular estimators of long-term stock performance. There have been 
suggested multiple modified versions of the two methodologies coupled 
with a vast number of different correctional and statistical tests. Our re-
search’s general assignment is to decompose the abnormal returns of 
merged companies to extract the sources of abnormalities. Under this con-
ception, it is required to have a well specified stock performance measure. 
We find that the buy-and-hold abnormal return as advocated by Lyon et 
al. (1999) is the most appropriate choice for our research objective. First, 
BHAR is a better measure of investors’ actual long-run experience. Second, 
it is less prone to bad model problems, as it investigates the difference in 
return between the merged firm and the benchmark (Loughran & Ritter, 
2000). Third, recent simulation studies by Ang & Zhang (2015), reveals 
that the calendar time portfolio is less powerful compared to BHAR when 
applied for horizons longer than a year. This is because the calendar-time 
portfolio method did not catch the effect when the researchers added syn-
thetic abnormal returns to the portfolio each month. Thus, it is neither 
practical nor sensible to use any further testing procedures other than 
BHAR for the long-term analysis. Regardless, as a supplement, we will 
check whether the long-term CAR method yields the same results as 
BHAR, while our study´s focus will lie on the BHAR results.  
 
As for the benchmark, we use seventy size/book-to-market reference 
portfolios, formed as described in the section “4.4 Construction of Bench-
mark Portfolios”. The reason is that both rebalancing and new listing bi-
ases are eliminated by the construction of the abnormal return measure. In 
addition, Barber & Lyon (1997) report that standard tests based on a con-
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trol firm are not as powerful as those based on reference portfolio ap-
proach. The reason is that the use of a control firm is subject to higher 
noise exposure. 
 
We apply three test-statistics to test the null hypothesis that the mean 
long-run abnormal return is zero (see appendix for formulas). A conven-
tional t-test, bootstrapped Johnson’s t-test as advocated by Lyon et. al 
(1999) and a serial correlation consistent t-test proposed by Jegadeesh & 
Karceski (2009) (adjusted t-test). The advocated bootstrapping procedure 
corrects for cross-correlation under the assumption of independent abnor-
mal returns. The advantage of the adjusted t-test is that it overcomes the 
cross-correlation bias in non-random samples. The adjusted t-test is more 
appropriate to apply since M&As can be concentrated in specific indus-
tries/periods, thus non-random events. The test is a generalized version of 
Hansen & Hodrick (1980), allowing serial correlation and assuming ho-
moskedasticity.  
5 Data  
5.1 Sample Selection 
The data of U.S. M&As is obtained from SDC Thomson Financial Data-
base. This includes all deals between January 1st 2002 and December 31st 
2015 that fulfills a set of constraints. We ended up with 1,288 M&As after 
applying the following constraints:  
• Both acquirer and target are publicly traded  
• The deal must be defined as a merger or acquisition by SDC Thom-
son Financial Database 
• All acquirers are listed in the U.S.  
• The M&A must be completed 
• Deal value accumulates to at least $50 million 
• The deal must be completed within December 31st 2015 
• The acquirer’s ownership post acquisition is above 50% 
• Sufficient stock return data must be available for estimation pur-
poses 
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• Accounting information of acquirer and target must be available 
from Compustat IQ for estimation of market capitalization, market-
to-book ratio and return on capital employed (ROCE) 
The choice of time dimension is due to two important reasons. Following 
previous studies presented in figure 4, the end date is chosen accordingly 
to satisfy an investigation period for the long-run BHAR analysis of three 
years. As a result, the latest completion date of a M&A is no later than 
December 31st 2015. This is because CRSP only has available data until 
December 2018. Secondly, the start date is set to January 1st 2002 to avoid 
outcomes from the dotcom debacle and the effect of pooling on the choice 
of payment method. Prior to 2002, acquirers had the possibility of pooling 
their assets with the target, given that the payment was all-stock. The 
method was synthesized by a reevaluation of the target´s assets and liabili-
ties at fair value and allowing to acknowledge goodwill under the circum-
stance of difference between deal value and reevaluated net assets (Bodt, 
Cousin & Roll, 2016). Thus, acquirers could diminish the effect on their fi-
nancial ratios due to the acquisition (Reda, 1999).  
 
Following Darkow & Schiereck (2008) and Laabs & Schiereck (2008), we 
constrain the deal value to be at least $50 million. Bigger acquisitions are 
of greater economic significance and worth more attention (Gregory, 1997).  
5.2 Start of The Event Window  
Following Mitchell & Stafford (1999), we set the start of the event win-
dow at the end of the completion month for the long-run BHAR analysis.  
5.3 Returns, Size and Book-to-Market 
Monthly holding period return data and stock prices for acquirers and 
targets listed on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq are retrieved from CRSP. For 
targets in cross-border acquisitions, stock prices are collected from SDC 
Thomson Financial Database. Firm size is computed by multiplying the 
average monthly stock price with the number of common stocks outstand-
ing at the end of the month. The book value per share is retrieved from 
Compustat IQ, where book value is defined as:  
• The sum of the following: 
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§ Common stock  
§ Capital surplus 
§ Retained earnings 
§ Self-insurance reserves  
§ Capital stock premium 
• Less the following:  
§ Common treasury stock  
§ Accumulated unpaid preferred dividends 
§ Excess of involuntary liquidation value of preferred stock over 
carrying value 
Computing the book-to-market ratio, we again follow Mitchell & Staf-
ford (1999) and take fiscal year-end book value of equity divided by mar-
ket capitalization of common stocks at calendar year-end. The most recent 
fiscal year-end book value of equity is used, as long as it´s no later than 
the calendar year-end market value of equity. Consequently, all annual 
data reported in January through May fiscal year basis is considered to be 
in the preceding year. Lastly, 36 acquirers had a negative book value per 
share. Since this is relatively rare, they were excluded from the analysis 
(Lyon, Barber, Tsai 1999).   
5.4 Selection of Independent Variables  
The independent variables are selected based on previous literature dis-
cussed in section 2.5 and the qualitative factors affecting M&As in figure 
3. However, because we are looking at several industries, some other 
measures than those commonly used in the literature must be applied, as 
most studies are focusing on specific industries.  
5.4.1   Cross-Border  
  Cross-border is a variable taking the value 1 if the target is listed outside 
the U.S. and taking the value 0 if the target is U.S. listed. This variable is 
included in most studies regarding M&A success and is therefore seen as a 
potential determinant of success. Also, in figure 3, under the post-M&A 
phase column, it´s stated that one needs to integrate the culture of the 
merging firms. Cross-border as a variable might capture the extent to 
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which firms are successfully able, on average, to integrate the two firms` 
culture into the new entity or not.  
5.4.2   Relative Profitability 
Relative profitability between acquirer and target is often tested as a de-
terminant of successful M&As. This is tested by taking the difference of 
the two-year average ROE before the announcement for acquirer and tar-
get. Furthermore, in figure 3, under the pre-M&A phase column, it is 
stated that one needs to assess the management capabilities of the acquirer 
and target to increase the probability of yielding a successful transaction. 
Relative profitability may be a good proxy for the management capabili-
ties of the acquirer and target. However, ROE may give us problems when 
comparing profitability. That is because our data contain companies across 
industries. Different industries tend to have a different amount of debt, 
which is something we need to adjust for. On this basis, it is more appro-
priate to use ROCE, which is defined as 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸 = 퐸퐵퐼푇퐶푎푝푖푡푎푙 퐸푚푝푙표푦푒푑. Thus, 
ROCE measures how efficiently a firm utilizes all available capital to gen-
erate additional profits, as opposed to ROE, which only measures how effi-
ciently a firm uses equity. However, besides our initial analysis, we are go-
ing to see if ROE produces similar results.  
5.4.3   Price-to-Book 
While previous research does not necessarily examine the impact of ac-
quirers and targets P/B on M&A success, Kaplan & KPMG (2007) did as-
sess acquirers and targets P/E on deal success. As they say, less is more. 
They found that acquirers and targets with low P/E were more successful 
than acquirers and targets with high P/E. However, using P/E may cause 
some problems. Firstly, P/E does not provide any meaning if a company 
has low or negative earnings (Pereiro, 2002). Secondly, targets outside the 
U.S. may follow other accounting rules, which affects earnings. Nonethe-
less, P/B is suitable for firms in capital-intensive industries (Frykman & 
Toleryd, 2003). Our dataset is dominated by firms in capital-intensive in-
dustries. Thus P/B is a more suitable multiple than P/E. However, we are 
going to see if P/E produces similar results as P/B. 
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5.4.4   Method of Payment 
Many prior studies have found that method of payment has a significant 
effect on M&A performance: stock payments yields lower success than cash 
payments (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Brown & Ryngaert, 1991; Fuller & 
Glatzer, 2003). Stock payment sends a signal to the market that the stock 
price may be quoted above its fundamental value. Hence, one expects these 
transactions to be less successful than transactions paid with cash (Myers 
& Majluf, 1984). To measure the difference in effect between the payment 
methods, we include all-stock and all-cash as two separate dummies, thus 
excluding combined stock and cash payment.   
5.4.5   Friendly Takeovers  
In the pre-2000 period, hostile takeovers were quite normal. However, 
hostile takeovers have become uncommon in the post-2000 period. Regard-
less, prior research seems to agree on that friendly takeovers is a determi-
nant for success, and should, therefore, be included in our analysis.  
5.4.6   Deal Rationale 
The deal rationale is based on ten dummy variables, which are not mu-
tually exclusive. We are using the rationales explicitly stated for each deal 
in the SDC Thomson Financial database. Those are:  
• Expand presence in primary market  
• Expand presence in new/foreign markets 
• Expand presence in new geographical regions 
• Concentrate on core business 
• Expand presence in secondary market 
• Competitors market position 
• Offer new products 
• Create synergies 
• Increase shareholder value 
• Proceed used to pay down existing outstanding debt  
We have not seen research on those M&A motives previously, but we 
think that some might be determinants of M&A success. 
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5.4.7   Relative Size 
One of the important factors that might determine M&A success is the 
relative size of the target and acquirer. It is measured as the transaction 
value over acquirer’s size (measured by market capitalization). Studies by 
Ramaswamy & Waegelein (2003) and Healy, Palepu & Ruback (1992) 
found that relative size might be a determinant. Their studies were con-
sistent, suggesting that M&A performance is negatively correlated with 
relative size. We choose to include this variable because we think it might 
be a proxy for both the expected synergy potential and the integration dif-
ficulty/costs. Acquiring relatively bigger companies should yield higher in-
tegration costs and synergies. Larger targets may also require higher pre-
miums and it should be harder to manage, which might impact the post-
M&A abnormal return.  
5.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Year 
 
 
M&As 
 
%Cross 
Border 
 
%Friendly 
Takeovers 
 
%Stock 
payments 
 
%Cash 
payments 
 
Avg. P/B 
Acquirer 
Avg. 
P/B 
Target 
 
Avg. Diff.  
ROCE 
 
Avg. Deal 
Size  
 
Avg. Rel. 
Size 
Avg. 
Mark. 
Cap. 
2002 60 15% 97% 26.7% 33.3% 3.1 2.8 14.7% 511 0.23 21,419 
2003 95 13.7% 95.7% 27.4% 30.5% 2.4 6.2 24.9% 1,318 0.288 20,962 
2004 124 14.5% 99.2% 25.8% 33.9% 2.5 2.7 2.8% 2,015 0.214 23,249 
2005 123 10.6% 96.7% 21.1% 38.2% 2.8 3.3 5.5% 2,453 0.306 19,848 
2006 117 10.2% 97.4% 15.4% 44.4% 2.7 3.0 3.1% 2,984 0.295 29,237 
2007 152 11.1% 98.7% 15.1% 51.3% 2.9 3.3 6.6% 1,768 0.312 23,296 
2008 100 15% 99% 22% 44% 3.2 3.7 9.7% 1,539 0.41 17,657 
2009 48 16.7% 97.9% 25% 35.4% 2.4 4.1 11.1% 4,701 0.26 34,825 
2010 83 15.6% 98.8% 15.7% 49.4% 2.5 2.7 11.5% 1,931 0.177 30,719 
2011 59 23.7% 96.6% 22% 33.9% 1.8 2.4 5.9% 1,740 0.312 15,601 
2012 72 15.2% 98.6% 18% 51.4% 2.4 2.5 6.3% 3,074 0.303 29,702 
2013 74 13.5% 100% 21.6% 43.2% 2.2 2.8 4.8% 2,278 0.553 19,704 
2014 80 12.5% 100% 20% 42.5% 2.4 2.5 1.5% 2,449 0.301 20,002 
2015 101 11.9% 99% 20.7% 30.7% 3.5 2.9 4.9% 3,333 0.415 20,692 
Mean 92 14.2% 98.2% 21.1% 40.1% 2.6 3.2 8.1% 2,292 0.312 23,351 
Figure 7: Sample statistics. Average market capitalization (acquirers) and deal size is 
measured in millions. Deal rationale is excluded. 
 
From figure 7, we see that there have been 1,288 M&As from the year 
2002 until 2015, after taking our constraints into account. This is equiva-
lent to 92 M&As per year. Our data is dominated by domestic acquisi-
tions, whereas cross-border deals represent 14.2% of the M&As. Not sur-
prisingly, almost every M&A is friendly. 98.2% of the deals are friendly, 
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which stands in contrast to M&As in the pre-2000 period, where hostile 
takeovers were common. As mentioned earlier, acquirers prefer cash pay-
ment over stock payment. Yet, one-fifth of the M&As are paid with stocks, 
whereas 40.1% are paid with cash, and the rest is paid with a combination 
of stocks and cash. One might, therefore, think that 21.1% of our sample 
acquirers were overvalued in the stock market. The average P/B for ac-
quirers over the sample period is 2.6, while 3.2 for targets. Thus, acquirers 
are buying relatively more expensive companies compared to themselves. 
This might reflect that targets are smaller and have higher growth oppor-
tunities compared to acquirers. The average difference in ROCE is positive 
for every year in our sample period and corresponds to an average of 8.1%. 
Acquirers are therefore buying relatively less profitable targets, suggesting 
that they believe additional value can be generated. Moreover, we can see 
that the average deal value per year far exceeds our constraint of mini-
mum $50 million. In fact, the average deal value is $2,291 million, which 
accumulates to $32,094 million over the sample period. As suspected, ac-
quirers are in fact buying smaller targets. The average market capitaliza-
tion for acquirers is $23,351 million, which surpasses the average deal size 
of $2,292 million. This is also reflected in the average relative size, which is 
less than one for every year.  
6 Results 
6.1 Overall Short-Term Effect 
Figure 8 reports the short-term announcement effect of M&As on the to-
tal sample of U.S. acquirers. This table is quite revealing in several ways. 
First, the same day as announcement, acquiring shareholders lose a statis-
tically significant -0.67% (z-value = -4.5) abnormal return in the [0, 0] 
event-window. In the [-10, 10] event-window, the loss is reduced to -0.22%. 
Second, positive CAARs are only obtained in the [-20, 20], [-20, -1] and [1, 
20] event-window, but only [-20, -1] is statistically significant. The [-20, -1] 
event-window is, however, before announcement day. As mentioned, previ-
ous findings suggest that U.S. acquirers CARs are slightly negative or in-
significant (Walker, 2000). This is consistent with our findings, indicating 
negative announcement abnormal returns or insignificant positive abnor-
mal returns. This finding may reflect that the capital market has a nega-
tive perception of the deal´s synergy potentials as soon as the M&A has 
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been announced, and therefore destroys value for acquiring shareholders. 
However, since the announcement abnormal returns are slightly negative 
or zero, the market seems to be quite efficient.  
 
Event-window CAAR t-test z-test Gen. sign test 
  t-value p-value z-value p-value z-value p-value 
[-20, 20] 0.39% 0.8 0.37 0.14 0.88 0.68 0.49 
[-10, 10] -0.22% -0.8 0.39 -1.6 0.1 -1.9 0.05 
[-5, 5] -0.44% -2.3 0.019 -2.2 0.02 -1.6 0.114 
[-1, 1] -0.79% -7.1 <.001 -4.0 <.001 -4.5 <.001 
[0, 0] -0.67% -10.1 <.001 -4.5 <.001 -4.7 <.001 
[-20, -1] 0.89% 3.2 0.0013 2.6 0.009 2.5 0.013 
[1, 20] 0.17% 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Figure 8: Equally-weighted CAR (CAAR) for sample acquirers. See appendix (figure 
A) for value-weighted CAR. 
 
In figure 9, there is a clear trend of positive statistically significant cu-
mulative abnormal returns for sample targets. The same day as announce-
ment, in contrast to acquirers, targets earn a significant 16.9% (z-value = 
29.5) abnormal return in the [0, 0] event-window. This increases to an out-
standing 25.79% statistically significant abnormal return in the [10, 10] 
event-window. The current findings add to a growing body of studies on 
short-term M&A wealth creation. Both Netter et al. (2011) and Dodd & 
Ruback (1977) found an announcement abnormal return of around 20% for 
targets. Targets have been paid an average premium of around 20% and 
thus creates wealth for the shareholders. 
 
Event-window CAAR t-test z-test Gen. sign test 
  t-value p-value z-value p-value z-value p-value 
[-20, 20] 26.54% 49.0 <.001 38.7 <.001 29.0 <.001 
[-10, 10] 25.79% 66.6 <.001 40.6 <.001 30.3 <.001 
[-5, 5] 25.4% 90.7 <.001 41.1 <.001 31.4 <.001 
[-1, 1] 24.21% 165.5 <.001 40.4 <.001 31.9 <.001 
[0, 0] 16.9% 200.1 <.001 29.5 <.001 23.4 <.001 
[-20, -1] 3.12% 8.2 <.001 9.2 <.001 8.5 <.001 
[1, 20] 6.52% 17.2 <.001 13.3 <.001 6.8 <.001 
Figure 9: Equally-weighted CAR (CAAR) for sample targets. See appendix (figure B) 
for value-weighted CAR. 
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Figure 10 shows the development of acquirers, targets and the theoreti-
cal combined entity´s CAARs for the whole event-window. From day -20 
to -1, we can see that there is a “run-up,” indicating inside information 
trading or leakage of information. Because of the run-up in acquirers 
CAAR, the market seems to perceive the M&A as good news. However, on 
announcement day, the CAAR drops heavily. This suggests that the mar-
ket overreacted to the rumors/inside information, resulting in lower abnor-
mal returns. While the CAARs are positive for all days except days 1 and 
7, the heavy drop at announcement day is the reason for the negative re-
sults in figure 8. Moreover, targets CAAR experiences an extreme increase 
on announcement day. This suggests that their stock price increases with 
the premium paid by acquirers, and thereafter flattens out. Lastly, the the-
oretical combined entity CAARs are only slightly positive, even with the 
dramatic increase of targets CAARs. That is because acquirers are 
weighted more heavily.  
 
 
Figure 10: CAARs to acquirers, targets and the theoretical combined entity. 
 
From the descriptive statistics, the reported average market capitaliza-
tion for acquirers is $23,351 million. By taking the negative announcement 
abnormal returns into account, acquirers have lost on average $156 million 
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on announcement day. Moreover, the average market capitalization for 
targets is $1,656 million. On announcement day, target shareholders have 
earned around $280 million. M&As, therefore, have delivered a net-eco-
nomic gain of $124 million and thus creates value overall, which supports 
the findings of Bradley et al. (1988). This is also reflected in the theoreti-
cal combined entity graph in figure 10.  
6.2 Overall Long-Term Effect  
Figure 11 represents the long-term BHARs (Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Returns) of U.S. acquirers across all industries. Overall, during the three-
year investigation period, BHARs are found to be consistently negative for 
both equally- and value-weighted methods. The three-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for the equal-weighted method is estimated to be -25.8%. 
This is consistent with previous findings, which report long-term BHARs 
of around -20% (Black et al., 2001; Gregory & Matatko, 2004). The regular 
t-test is reported to be -13.7. Thus, it seems to be highly significant. How-
ever, we put a great amount of effort in the methodology section to discuss 
the severe bias that arises in the regular t-stat for the BHAR method. Af-
ter adjusting this following Lyon et al. (1999) and Jegadeesh & Karceski 
(2009), we got a bootstrapped t-test of -10.51 and a serial-correlation con-
sistent t-test (adjusted t-test) of -2.09. This even more confirms the statis-
tical significance of the equally-weighted method. Furthermore, the value-
weighted method, estimated using market capitalization, yields a BHAR of 
-34%. The regular, bootstrapped and adjusted t-tests are -10.5, -12.1 and   
-1.85 respectively. Contrary to the equally-weighted method, the adjusted 
t-test indicates a lower significance level (10%). The different results be-
tween the equally- and value-weighted method can be addressed to the de-
layed effects of the dotcom bubble. Larger firms were more heavily af-
fected, resulting in lower BHARs for the value-weighted method.  
 
Time Equally-weighted BHAR  Value-weighted BHAR 
 BHAR t-test Boot.str. t-test Adj. t-test  BHAR t-test Boot.str. t-test Adj. t-test 
3 years -25.8% -13.7 -10.51 -2.09  -34% -10.5 -12.1 -1.85 
Figure 11: Acquirers BHAR with regular t-test, bootstrapped t-test (Lyon et al. (1999)) 
and adjusted t-test (Jegadeesh & Karceski (2009)). 
 
 35 
To test the credibility of the BHAR results, a long-term CAR analysis 
was conducted (see figure 12). In conformity with the equally-weighted 
BHAR result, acquirers yielded an equally-weighted long-term CAR of      
-19.1%, with a regular, bootstrapped, and adjusted t-test of -12.69, -13.2 
and -1.63. The CAR seems to be significant, but the adjusted t-test raises 
some concerns. Although the literature is consistent with our findings, it is 
questionable to find such a negative result. Prior studies have emphasized 
on the importance of using the right benchmark, as the results are subject 
to severe bias when not using an appropriate reference group. Even tough 
M&As in general might be value-destroying, it is natural to think that 
most studies, including ours, are not appropriately adjusted for risk (Bet-
ton, Eckbo & Thorburn, 2008). Alternatively, M&As might be a reaction 
of negative macroeconomic shocks. The merged firm might perform better 
than it would have without the M&A, which may still be worse than the 
pre-M&A performance (Hartford, 2005), resulting in severe negative 
BHARs. However, the current findings add to a growing body of literature 
that M&As tend to be value-destroying in a long-term perspective.  
 
Time Equally-weighted CAR  Value-weighted CAR 
 CAR t-test Boot.str. t-test Adj. t-test  CAR t-test Boot.str. t-test Adj. t-test 
3 years -19.1% -12.69 -13.2 -1.63  -24.2% -8.51 -12.45 -1.92 
Figure 12: Acquirers CAR with regular t-test, bootstrapped t-test (Lyon et al. (1999)) 
and adjusted t-test (Jegadeesh & Karceski (2009)). 
 
 
Data from figure 13, which shows the development of acquirers BHARs 
over the whole sample period, can be compared with the data in figure 11. 
The BHARs are severely negative for both equally- and value-weighted 
methods in the year 2002. This may be a result of the delayed effects of 
the dotcom bubble. Our data contains some big tech firms, and since 
larger tech firms were more heavily affected, it may explain why the value-
weighted method yields significantly lower abnormal returns. Acquirers 
that experienced the negative shocks may have reacted by doing M&As in 
a desperate attempt to increase their profitability. As argued, they may 
have performed better than without the M&A, which may still be worse 
than the pre-M&A performance, resulting in negative BHARs. After 2002 
and all the way to 2007, M&As were performing significantly better. How-
ever, at the forefront of the financial crisis in 2008, the value-weighted 
BHARs drops heavily. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, BHARs 
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steadily increases until 2014, where the BHARs average around 0%. Hence, 
M&As in 2014 seems to be neither value-destroying nor value-creating. Fi-
nally, by averaging the two graphed lines, we arrive at the reported 
BHARs in figure 11.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: BHARs to acquirers. 
 
 
6.3 Determinants of M&A Success 
Figure 14 presents findings about the impact of the potential determi-
nants on the acquirer’s long-term abnormal returns. The three-year 
BHARs has been regressed on six different models, where Reg.2 includes 
all independent variables previously discussed. We finally arrived at the 
following coefficients and significance levels: 
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Regressions 
Variables Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.3 Reg.4 Reg.5 Reg.6 
Intercept -0.19***  0.013  0.015  0.018  0.149 -0.101 
Rel. Size  0.05**  0.037  0.036  0.036  0.033  0.043* 
P/B Acquirer -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.089***  
P/B Target -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**  
Rel. Profit. (ROCE) -0.138** -0.135** -0.131* -0.131* -0.128*  
All-Stock -0.083 -0.097* -0.097* -0.096* -0.204** -0.082 
All-Cash 0.096** 0.109** 0.108** 0.109** -0.084 0.059 
Friendly  -0.222 -0.223 -0.225 -0.219  
Cross-Border  -0.079 -0.079 0.079 -0.066 -0.11** 
CMP  -0.14* -0.14* -0.141* -0.144** -0.15** 
SYN   0.127***  0.127***  0.123***  0.129***  0.12*** 
ESM  -0.271*** -0.271*** -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.27*** 
Rel.Prof.*Rel.Size   -0.031 -0.033 -0.015  
ESM*SYN     0.141  0.152  
P/B Acq.*All-Stock      0.045  
P/B Acq.*All-Cash      0.075***  
Rel.Prof.*CMP      0.027  
P/E Acquirer       0.0009* 
P/E Target       0.0009** 
Rel. Profit. (ROE)      -0.008 
Figure 14: Acquirers BHARs regressed on the potential determinants. All deal rationale 
dummies (see section 5.4.6) that were statistically insignificant were removed from the ta-
ble. The deal rationales included in the table is: Expansion of presence in secondary mar-
ket (ESM), Acquiring competitors because of their market position (CMP) and Creating 
synergies (SYN). All numbers are in decimals. 
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
6.3.1   Relative Size 
From the data in figure 14 under the first column, it is apparent that 
the coefficient on relative size is positive and statistically significant at a 
5% level. The calculations in this work, therefore, suggest that larger rela-
tive size contributes to M&A success. This contradicts the study of Laabs 
& Schiereck (2008). They argue that larger transactions are usually more 
complex. Hence, integration costs might be much higher compared to 
smaller deals. In addition, higher relative transactions might suffer from 
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overpayment. Among the plausible explanations for our finding is that 
larger transactions are more likely to result in economies of scale (Ferris & 
Park, 2001). In conformity, Durand & Vargas (2003) argues that company 
size can be regarded as an indicator of a certain level of productive effi-
ciency, accumulated over time. The larger the targets, the higher their im-
plied efficiency and the larger the economies of scale potentially realized 
through the deal. Thus, one might get rid of overlapping tasks resulting in 
efficiency gains and cost savings. Moreover, large firms are usually charac-
terized by a low P/B ratio, which may represent more fairly priced targets. 
It can therefore be argued that larger targets will give the acquirers better 
chances at utilizing the expected synergies because they may not be over-
priced. There might be, however, several other reasons for such a finding. 
Although relative size is significant in Reg.1, it remains statistically insig-
nificant when controlling for other variables through Reg.2-Reg.5. There-
fore, the result from Reg.1 can only serve as an indication.  
6.3.2   P/B Acquirer 
It was found that the coefficient on P/B Acquirer is negative, and its 
highly statistically significant at a 1% level for all regressions. Hence, the 
acquirer’s P/B ratio is negatively correlated with M&A success. Kaplan & 
KPMG (2007) found a negative relation between abnormal returns and the 
acquirer’s P/E ratio, which is in good agreement with the results of the 
present study. The finding provides evidence that M&As conducted by ac-
quirers with lower P/B ratios perform better. Interestingly, this correlation 
might be related to several factors. First, acquirers with low P/B ratios 
might not be as willing as high P/B acquirers to participate in riskier deals 
because their stock price might reflect fair value. Since high P/B firms 
may have an overvalued stock price, they might have a difficult time in-
creasing their value after a M&A and might see their stock price revert to 
the industry average (Kaplan & KPMG, 2007). As a result, low P/B ac-
quirers might pay with cash, while high P/B acquirers may prefer stock 
payments. As argued, stock payments might send a negative signal to the 
market, resulting in negative returns. This argument is supported by the 
highly statistically significant interaction term (P/B Acq.*All-Cash) in 
Reg.5, where cash payments yield a higher coefficient on P/B Acquirer of  
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-0.014 (0.075-0.089). However, there could be many other possible explana-
tions for our findings. The relevance of acquirer’s P/B ratio is clearly sup-
ported by the current findings.  
 
As mentioned in the selection of the independent variables section, we 
have tested if the acquirer´s P/E ratio produces similar results as P/B in 
Reg.6. Surprisingly, P/E Acquirer indicates a minor positive impact on 
M&A success at a significance level of 10%. Since we argued that P/B is a 
better valuation metric for our data combined with the fact that P/E has 
a considerable small coefficient, we find the effect of P/E irrelevant on ab-
normal returns.  
6.3.3   P/B Target 
The results of the present study also suggest that targets P/B has a sta-
tistically significant negative effect on deal success, which also is in line 
with the findings of Kaplan & KPMG (2007). Hence, acquisitions of low 
P/B targets seem to perform better than acquisitions of high P/B targets. 
A reason for this might be that low P/B targets are likely to represent ac-
quisitions that are more fairly priced or where an underperforming business 
is present. In the case of fairly priced targets, the expected synergies are 
more likely to outweigh the premium paid, which should result in higher 
abnormal returns. For underperforming targets, however, it should be eas-
ier to turn the target around and create substantial additional value. An-
other potential reason might be that value targets often have better rou-
tines and practices than growth targets, which should result in additional 
synergy-gains.  
 
Similarly, as for P/B acquirer, we tested if targets P/E yielded the same 
result as targets P/B. The result again contradicts, implying a positive re-
lationship between deal success and targets P/E. Once again, we consider 
the result of P/E irrelevant, due to its minor impact on abnormal returns.  
6.3.4   Relative Profitability  
The single most striking observation to emerge from figure 14 is relative 
profitability. Interestingly, it yields a negative coefficient that is significant 
at either a 10% or 5% level for all regressions. Hence, the present finding 
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suggests that relatively less profitable acquirers earn higher abnormal re-
turns. However, several studies show that serious differences do exist, al-
beit findings are somewhat contradictory: both Hawawini & Swary (1990) 
and Moore, Braggion & Dwarkasing (2012) found a positive relationship 
between acquirer’s abnormal return and relative profitability. However, 
our findings might reflect that acquirers may benefit from acquiring profit-
able targets rather than improving their business model to create substan-
tial additional value. That is because relatively profitable targets might 
have more capable managers. Thus, the acquirer can gain new expertise, 
which may result in additional value-creation.   
 
To test if more profitable and larger targets jointly affect deal success, 
we included an interaction term in Reg.3. This variable is statistically in-
significant, indicating that larger and more profitable targets do not jointly 
affect deal success. However, less profitable targets might be viewed as 
more risky investments, which may lower acquirer’s stock price and result 
in an unsuccessful deal. Since our data, and M&As in general, are domi-
nated by horizontal deals, another potential reason may be that more prof-
itable targets are acquired to reduce competition. We tested this argument 
in Reg.5 by the interaction term Rel.prof.*CMP. The variable is not statis-
tically significant, causing the argument to fail. Regardless, the result of 
this investigation shows that relatively less profitable acquirers might be a 
determinant of M&A success.  
 
Because relative profitability is usually determined using ROE in prior 
studies, we tested its impact in Reg.6. It is evident that ROE is statisti-
cally insignificant and does not provide evidence for having the same im-
pact as ROCE.  
6.3.5   Method of Payment 
Consistent with findings by Gregory (1997) and Loughran & Vijh 
(1997), we found all-cash payments having a positive impact on the ac-
quirer’s abnormal returns. This variable is consistently statistically signifi-
cant at a 5% level through Reg.1-Reg.4. Cash payments may therefore pro-
vide higher abnormal returns than combined cash and stock payments. In 
contrast, all-stock payments have a negative coefficient in Reg.2-Reg.4, in-
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dicating that all-stock payments yield lower abnormal returns than com-
bined cash and stock payments. The findings suggest that companies fi-
nancing M&As with stocks sometimes perceive their stock to be a cheaper 
payment method because it may be overvalued. Especially if their P/B 
value, or other valuation metrics, is higher than average. This argument 
reflects the findings of Martin (1996), which reports that stock payments 
are associated with low book-to-market ratios (growth firms) while cash 
payments are associated with high book-to-market ratios (value firms). 
Furthermore, because cash deals are often financed with debt, acquirers 
might yield an added return on equity benefit from the effects of leverage, 
resulting in more successful M&As. With our regression result as a basis, 
all-cash payments seem to be a determinant for M&A success.  
6.3.6   Friendly Takeovers 
One of the most surprising results to emerge from the analysis is that 
friendly/hostile takeovers do not affect abnormal returns, as it´s not statis-
tically significant. The above findings contradict the study by Schleifer & 
Vishny (2003). A likely explanation might be due to that 98.2% of the 
deals in our data are friendly, and might therefore not provide a clear dis-
tinction between friendly and hostile takeovers. As a result, neither 
friendly nor hostile takeovers seem to provide evidence for being a determi-
nant for successful M&As. This result is probably subject to the nature of 
our data, as the literature is quite consistent on that friendly takeovers 
perform better than hostile takeovers.  
6.3.7   Cross-Border  
Another variable that is not statistically significant is cross-border acqui-
sition. The literature is, as previously stated, concur on the topic: cross-
border deals tend to destroy value. Our result might, however, be ex-
plained by globalization. The degree of globalization has dramatically in-
creased in the post-2000 period, forcing companies to adapt. Large U.S. 
firms tend to be internationally integrated, and they might therefore be in-
different between domestic and cross-border acquisitions, causing the vari-
able to be insignificant.  
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6.3.8   Deal Rationale 
Among the several deal rationales, only three were statistically signifi-
cant. Expansion of presence in secondary market (ESM) yields a negative 
coefficient and is statistically significant at a 5% level, suggesting a de-
crease in abnormal returns when ESM is the rationale. Moreover, the coef-
ficient on synergies (SYN) is positive, which indicates an increase in abnor-
mal returns when the rationale is to realize synergies. This variable is sta-
tistically significant at a 1% level. Lastly, competitors market position 
(CMP) reports, similarly to ESM, a negative coefficient with a significance 
level of 10%. Hence, when the deal rationale is to acquire a competitor be-
cause of its technology/strategic assets, one expects a decrease in abnormal 
returns. There are few studies of deal rationale on abnormal returns, how-
ever, Kaplan & KPMG (2007) did examine different rationales on the ac-
quirer’s stock return. They found that acquisitions that were motivated by 
increasing financial wealth, improving distribution channels or increasing 
earnings, yielded positive effects on M&A success. That is in good agree-
ment with the results of SYN, which can be seen as obtaining either opera-
tional or financial synergies.  
 
Regarding ESM and CMP, the present finding also supports Kaplan & 
KPMGs (2007) study, which concluded that the rationale of vertical inte-
gration or acquiring competitors based on their market position yielded 
negative effects on M&A success. Our findings may be explained by the 
fact that companies motivated by synergies have generally identified spe-
cific areas of synergies and cost reduction that may be implemented rela-
tively easily. In addition, the deal rationale of ESM and CMP may be 
deals that were motivated by a desire to purchase intellectual property or 
technology of targets with very high financial multiples. Because targets 
with a unique intellectual property may be able to demand a high price, 
one that might not be justified, could explain the negative effect on abnor-
mal returns. However, acquirers might sometimes perform vertical acquisi-
tions with the goal of achieving synergies and controlling supplier’s pro-
duction. This joint effect was tested in the interaction term ESM*SYN in 
Reg.4. As it is statistically insignificant, it does not seem to affect deal suc-
cess. Regardless, the rationale of gaining synergies seems to be the only 
motive that might be a determinant of M&A success. 
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6.4 Robustness Checks 
After running the initial regression Reg.2, a variance inflation factor 
(VIF), Breusch-Pagan and Ramsey Reset test was conducted. The VIF 
quantifies the correlation between one factor and the other factors in our 
model. The Breusch-Pagan test examines whether the variance of the er-
rors from our regression is dependent on the value of the independent vari-
ables. Lastly, The Ramsey Reset test determines whether non-linear com-
binations of the fitted values could explain the dependent variable 
(BHAR). We obtained low VIF values for every independent variable, well 
below the scientifically accepted threshold value of 10. This result is sup-
ported by the correlation matrix in the appendix (figure C). Thus, there 
seem to be no multicollinearity issues in our data.  
 
From the Breusch-Pagan test of homoscedasticity, we got a p-value of 
0.98, suggesting that we support the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 
This is confirmed by the informal heteroscedasticity test in the appendix 
(figure D).  
 
We also checked whether our variables need non-linear specifications us-
ing the Ramsey Reset test. The Ramsey Reset test yielded a p-value of 
0.27, indicating that we support the null hypothesis that we don’t need 
further non-linear specifications.  
 
When excluding/including variables in figure 14, the coefficients and 
their significance level remain pretty constant, except for relative size. 
Hence, the variables consistently have the same correlation with BHAR 
through Reg.1-Reg.5, and therefore provides the same conclusions as pro-
vided in section 6.3. However, when testing relative profitability (measured 
by ROE), P/E acquirer and P/E target in Reg.6, we saw some changes in 
three of the potential determinants. Both all-cash and all-stock payments 
became insignificant, while cross-border became significant. However, the 
changes in the coefficients were small, and therefore suggests the same im-
pact on deal success. Because those variables that were tested are not ap-
propriate measurements for our data, we are not particularly concerned 
with those findings.  
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In conclusion, the predictors neither suffer from biases due to correlation 
nor non-linear misspecifications. Also, the data has a constant residual var-
iance implying a homoscedastic distributed data sample.  
7 Conclusion  
7.1 Summary 
The present study investigated potential determinants of M&A success 
by examining acquirers long-run abnormal returns. For this purpose, a 
sample of 1,288 U.S. transactions including all industries between 2002 and 
2015 were used to compute the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
In addition, we studied the short-term announcement effects for both the 
acquirers and targets using the cumulative abnormal returns. Most of our 
findings are confirming previous reported results of potential determinants 
on M&A success and its corresponding evaluation through capital markets, 
with some exceptions.  
 
First, before analyzing potential determinants of success, we assessed the 
short-term performance of M&As using the cumulative abnormal return 
method. Our finding is consistent with findings of past studies by Bradley 
et al. (1988); M&As are value-creating in a short-term perspective. None-
theless, this short-term gain is mostly earned by the shareholders of the 
target companies, whereas the acquiring shareholders has a small loss. 
Therefore, our analysis confirms the slightly negative announcement ab-
normal returns for U.S. acquirers as identified by Walker (2000). 
 
Second, acquirers’ short-term value-destruction persist in being destruc-
tive in the long-run. The long-term results using BHAR suggests value-de-
struction of 25.8% over a three-year investigation period, which is con-
sistent with Moeller et al. (2003). Likewise, the long-term CAR analysis re-
ports a value-destruction of -19.1%. Therefore, it seems like the negative 
synergy potentials perceived by capital markets at announcement day for 
acquirers are consistent with the results of the long-term analysis.  
 
Third, since our study suggests that the market efficiency hypothesis 
does not hold, we used the long-term BHARs to find potential determi-
nants of M&A success. Our results provide evidence for a negative impact 
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of acquirers and targets P/B ratio, relative profitability of acquirers vs. 
targets, all-stock payments and deal rationale (expanding the presence in 
secondary market and acquiring competitors because of their assets) on 
long-term post-M&A performance. In conformity with the findings of 
Kaplan & KPMG (2007), acquirers and targets P/B ratios yielded a nega-
tive impact on long-term post-M&A performance. High P/B acquirers 
might have an overvalued stock; thus, they may participate in riskier deals 
causing a negative impact on long-term performance. Likewise, high P/B 
targets may be overpriced, causing the premium paid to be greater than 
the expected synergies.  
 
Our findings on relative profitability stand in contrast to the study of 
Braggion & Dwarkasing (2012). Relatively more profitable acquirers per-
form worse (measured relative to the target), suggesting it’s harder to cre-
ate substantial additional value when acquiring a less profitable target. 
Less profitable targets might be viewed as more risky investments or repre-
sent high P/B firms. High P/B targets might be overvalued, which could 
cause the M&A to fail.  
 
The evidence from this study suggests the same as Loughran & Vijh 
(1997); M&As fully paid with stocks have a negative impact on long-term 
M&A success. It is assumed that “all-stock” payments signal overvalued 
acquirers (Myers & Majluf, 1984), resulting in acquirers to underperform 
relatively to our benchmark.  
 
Lastly, consistent with the findings of Kaplan & KPMG (2007), the deal 
rationale of expanding the presence in secondary market (ESM) and ac-
quiring competitors because of their market position (CMP) contributes 
towards unsuccessful M&As. ESM and CMP may be deals that were moti-
vated by a desire to purchase intellectual property or technology of very 
high financial multiples targets. Because targets with a unique intellectual 
property may be able to command a high price, the premium may exceed 
the synergy potentials.  
 
On the other hand, this study also determines a consistent positive effect 
of “all-cash” payments on long-term success, which reflects the findings of 
Fuller & Glatzer (2003). This may represent acquirers that are fairly 
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priced or acquirers that finance the deal with debt, which yields an added 
return on equity benefit from the effects of leverage. However, acquirers 
with a deal rationale of gaining synergies uniformly point towards M&A 
success. Companies motivated by synergies should generally have identified 
specific areas of synergies and cost reduction that may be implemented rel-
atively easily, giving the acquirer better chances at succeeding. Lastly, the 
influence of relative size remains inconclusive and could not ultimately be 
determined in this study. Our first regression indicates a positive impact of 
relative size. Thus, larger relative transactions should yield more synergies. 
When controlling for other variables, however, relative size becomes con-
sistently statistically insignificant.  
 
At last, cross-border and friendly/hostile M&As were found to be statis-
tically insignificant. Large acquirers, as in our dataset, tend to be globally 
integrated. Therefore, one might be indifferent between domestic and 
cross-border deals. Out of the 1,288 M&As analyzed, however, 98.2% were 
categorized as friendly, and a clear distinction between hostile and friendly 
takeovers could not be made.   
7.2 Caveats, Limitations and Suggestions for Further 
Research 
We should present some potential caveats for this study. First, the study 
of potential determinants of successful M&As was only conducted for U.S. 
listed acquirers across all industries. Thus, we are careful about generaliz-
ing our findings. Listed companies tend to be larger, and our results may 
not be representative for non-listed firms. In addition, different industries 
tend to have different characteristics, and our findings may not be repre-
sentative for every industry. Differences in culture and legal environment 
might also affect the determinants in other ways.  
 
This study may also be subject to two kinds of biases. First, when deter-
mining long-term M&A success, we estimate buy-and-hold abnormal re-
turns using a benchmark portfolio, which should represent non-event firms 
with similar risk as to the event firms. Although we are following classical 
studies in constructing those benchmark portfolios, our reference bench-
marks are not likely to be sufficiently adjusted for risk. Thus, our BHAR 
results may suffer from some bias. However, we believe that our results 
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give a good indication of whether M&As are successful or not. Second, 
when determining potential determinants of M&A success, a fixed number 
of independent variables were chosen. When performing the robustness 
checks, the coefficients and their significance level remain pretty constant 
through every regression. Even though the variables seem to be robust, 
there are other factors that influence abnormal returns, implying the possi-
bility of omitted variable bias. Regardless, since our analysis points toward 
robust variables and the determinants are consistent with most prior stud-
ies, we believe that the results give a fair indication of the impact of the 
determinants on long-term M&A success.  
 
Lastly, prior research on determinants of successful M&As has focused 
on ROE and P/E rather than ROCE and P/B. Based on the little atten-
tion given to ROCE and P/B as potential determinants, future research 
should aim to detect its relevance on long-term M&A performance.  
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9 Appendix 
Significance Tests Short-Term CAR: 
 
Crude Dependence Test: 
The crude dependence test uses the entire sample to calculate the vari-
ance. Let 𝑆퐴퐴푅 be the standard deviation of the average abnormal return 
and 𝑇2 − 𝑇1 is the event window length with 𝑇2 as the latest day of the 
event window relative to the event day. The test statistic is given by:  
 𝑡퐶퐴퐴푅 = 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇2 − 𝑇1 ∗ 𝑆퐴퐴푅 
 
Conventional Cross-Sectional Test: 
 𝑡퐶퐴퐴푅 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑆퐶퐴퐴푅  
 
Where 𝑆퐶퐴퐴푅 is the standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal re-
turns across the sample. 
 
Generalized Rank Sign Test:  
Let 𝐿1 = 𝑇1 − 𝑇0 + 1 be the estimation window length with 𝑇0 as the 
earliest day of the estimation window, and 𝑇1 the latest day of the estima-
tion window relative to the event day. 𝑁  is the sample size and 𝐾0 is the 
mean rank of abnormal returns for 𝑡 = 0. The variance and z-value can 
then be computed as:  
 𝑆퐾02 = 𝐿112𝑁(𝐿1 + 2) 
 𝑧 = 𝐾0𝑆퐾0 = 12𝑁(𝐿1 + 2)𝐿1 ∗ 𝐾0 
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Significance Tests Long-Term BHAR:  
 
Conventional Test:  
Let 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 be the average buy-and-hold abnormal return. The conven-
tional t-test is given by:  
 𝑡퐵퐻퐴푅 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑆퐵퐻퐴푅  
 
Where 𝑆퐵퐻퐴푅 is the standard deviation of the BHARs across the sam-
ple. 
 
Bootstrapped Johnson’s Test: 
The bootstrapping that we employ proceeds as follows: Draw 1,000 boot-
strapped resamples from the original sample of size 𝑁푏  = 𝑁/4. In each 
resample, the t-test underneath is calculated. Let 𝛾 be an estimate of the 
coefficient of skewness and 𝑁푏𝑆 is the conventional t-statistic. The boot-
strapped t-test is given by:  
 𝑡퐵퐻퐴푅 = 𝑁푏(𝑆 + 13 ∗ 𝛾𝑆2 + 16𝑁푏 𝛾) 
 
 
Adjusted T-Test:  
First, we define the average abnormal holding period return across all 
event firms that enters the sample in calendar month t as: 
 𝐴𝑅 = 1𝑁 𝐴𝑅푖 𝑡,𝐻  if 𝑁푡 > 0푁푡푖=1 0,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
 
Where 𝑁푡 is the number of observations in month 𝑡. 
 
Let 𝑤 be a monthly weight vector, where each weight is based on how 
many observations enters the specific month and 𝑣 a modified variance-co-
variance matrix. The autocorrelation-consistent t-statistic that we propose 
is given by:  
 
 54 
𝑡퐴푑푗푢푠푡푒푑 = 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑤´𝑣𝑤 
 
The modified variance-covariance matrix is determined as:  
 
𝑣푖,푗 =
𝜎2 = 1𝑇푁 𝐴𝑅(𝑡,𝐻)2,   𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗푇푡=1푁푡>0𝑝푗 = 1𝑇푁,푗 𝐴𝑅 𝑡,𝐻 ∗ 𝐴𝑅(𝑡+ 𝑗,𝐻)푇푡=1푁푡>0𝑁𝑡+𝑗>0 ,   𝑖𝑓 ≤ 𝑖 − 𝑗 ≤ 𝐻 − 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇푁푗 ≥ 50,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
where 𝑇푁  is the number of months that have at least one event, 𝑇푁,푗 is 
the number of months where both month t and month t+j have at least 
one event. 𝜎2 is the variance of the H-period abnormal returns of monthly 
cohorts. 𝑝푗 is the estimator of covariance between the abnormal returns of 
monthly portfolios that are separated by j months. To guard against large 
estimation errors in covariances, we require at least five cases where month 
t and month t+j both have at least one event. If 𝑇푁푗 < 5, we set the co-
variance to equal zero.  
 
Value-Weighted CAAR for Acquirers and Targets:  
 
Event-window CAAR t-test z-test Gen. sign test 
  t-value p-value z-value p-value z-value p-value 
[-20, 20] -1.65% -4.35 <.001 -4.57 <.001 -3.05 <.01 
[-10, 10] -1.29% -4.75 <.001 -4.84 <.001 -3.45 <.001 
[-5, 5] -0.98% -4.98 <.001 -3.75 <.001 -3.67 <.001 
[-1, 1] -0.89% -8.69 <.001 -4.24 <.001 -3.67 <.001 
[0, 0] -0.66% -11.1 <.001 -4.21 <.001 -4.4 <.001 
[-20, -1] -0.15% -0.55 >.1 -1.8 <.1 -1.54 >.1 
[1, 20] -0.85% -3.19 <.01 -2.68 <.01 -3.05 <.01 
Figure A: Value-weighted CAR (acquirers). 
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Event-window CAAR t-test z-test Gen. sign test 
  t-value p-value z-value p-value z-value p-value 
[-20, 20] 26.64% 49.54 <.001 38.84 <.001 29.13 <.001 
[-10, 10] 25.83% 67.12 <.001 40.78 <.001 30.78 <.001 
[-5, 5] 25.43% 91.29 <.001 41.14 <.001 31.61 <.001 
[-1, 1] 24.24% 166.64 <.001 40.48 <.001 31.99 <.001 
[0, 0] 16.91% 201.3 <.001 29.46 <.001 23.57 <.001 
[-20, -1] 3.16% 8.42 <.001 9.38 <.001 8.6 <.001 
[1, 20] 6.57% 17.5 <.001 13.42 <.001 6.71 <.001 
Figure B: Value-weighted CAR (targets). 
 
 
Robustness Checks:  
 
 
Figure C: Correlation matrix of independent variables. 
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Figure D: Informal heteroscedasticity test. 
